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I. INTRODUCTION
Are we ready to acknowledge that no means no? American law still retains
many remnants of the contrary view that “no” does not necessarily mean no. In
roughly half the states, unwanted penetration is not a felony absent some sort of
physical force or coercion beyond any forcible actions inherent in penetration
itself. 1 This issue, however, need not be retraced here; the unmistakable trend in
*
I owe special thanks, deep appreciation, and acknowledgement of contributions to this Article far
beyond the ordinary to my energetic and insightful colleague, collaborator and MPC co-Reporter Erin Murphy.
I am grateful to Professor Michael Vitiello for supporting this much-needed colloquium and for thoughtfully
challenging my current and prior efforts in this area over the many decades we have been colleagues. My
understanding of the issues has also benefited from advice, consultation and extensive conversation with others
far too numerous to name—the many judges, academics, prosecutors, defense counsel and other lawyers who
have made important contributions to the American Law Institute’s project to revise Article 213 of the MPC.
The views expressed in this Article are exclusively my own.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2 Apr. 28, 2015)
(hereinafter “MPC”).
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the recent legislation, jurisprudence, and academic writing is to the effect that, as
the FBI definition now puts it, rape is “[sexual] penetration without consent.” 2
The current debate, now raging with intensity, centers on the appropriate
understanding of that “without consent” requirement.
Putting aside issues concerning incapacity to consent and constraints on
ability to freely refuse consent, the red-hot dispute centers around the criteria for
establishing non-consent in cases involving a competent adult not under coercion
or duress. The debate is sometimes identified as a contest between two rallying
cries—“no means no” vs. “yes means yes.” 3 Both slogans are misleading—for
example, in seeming to prioritize verbal expression, but they conveniently
summarize the matter in dispute: whether penetration is ordinarily “without
consent” only when the person concerned has expressed unwillingness (nonconsent means “no”) or whether penetration is also “without consent” when the
person concerned has not expressed positive willingness (non-consent means the
absence of “yes”).
The choice between the two is not merely a matter of semantics. Sexual
communication is complex, and situational factors often impair people’s ability
to express willingness or unwillingness. Thus, much sexual interaction falls into
the space between “no” and “yes.” The law must take a stand on the treatment of
behavior in that space. When a person has not clearly indicated either willingness
or unwillingness, should it be permissible for another person to take the initiative
and proceed to penetration, so that only “no” means no, or should it be a criminal
offense to do so (so that absence of “yes” means no)?
Both approaches are prevalent in other areas of law and social practice. For
example, consent to a property transfer usually requires permission, not merely a
failure to object to someone’s taking it; 4 consent to adjourn a meeting is
commonly inferred from failure to object. 5 In the present context, the issue is
whether the law should assume that an adult is willing to have sex, even with
strangers and in unexpected encounters, until the individual specifically indicates
the contrary. Or, should unwillingness be assumed, even in the setting of parties
and dates, until the person signals receptivity to intercourse?
This statement of the issue leaves open one crucial point—the sort of conduct
sufficient to qualify as consent. It is impossible to talk intelligently about a
consent requirement without knowing what conception of consent is intended. If

2. An Updated Definition of Rape, U.S. DEP’T OF J.: JUSTICE BLOGS (last visited Sept. 15, 2014),
www.justice.gov/opa/blog/updated-definition-rape (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. See generally Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of
an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321 (2005) (describing the “yes means yes”
and “no means no” debate).
4. 63C AM. JUR. 2d Property § 24 (Feb. 2016).
5. House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House, GOV’T PUBLISHING
OFFICE (last visited Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-104/html/GPOHPRACTICE-104-2.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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consent requires a written, notarized agreement, that requirement is hardly
plausible. Yet discussion in popular media often ridicules a consent
requirement—rather than engaging it as a legitimate issue—by casting it in those
preposterous terms. 6 Of course, no serious supporter of a consent requirement has
ever suggested any such thing.
More plausibly, consent could be understood to require verbal permission,
possibly because body language alone is easily misinterpreted.7 This is not,
however, an argument I find persuasive, and as far as I know, no jurisdiction
mandates express verbal permission as a legally enforceable conception of
consent. Rather, wherever sexual consent has been formally defined and
required—whether in criminal law, 8 government-mandated codes of student
conduct, 9 or codes of conduct initiated by universities themselves 10—it has been
described as an expression of willingness or assent, communicated by all
behavior, including both words and actions.
In this paper, I argue that it is time—past time—to give workable content to
the notion of sexual consent and to require it as a prerequisite to the penetration
of another person. Before turning to the core of my argument, however, I will
explain the precise form of consent that I defend. Although it should be
uncontroversial that consent—whether favored or opposed—is something
communicated by the totality of a person’s conduct, there remains potential
ambiguity and significant disagreement about how such a requirement is best
framed. In Part I, I describe alternative formulations of consent-by-conduct that
are currently in play and identify the specific definition that I consider most
appropriate. 11 Part II then explains why consent, so understood, should always be
a prerequisite to sexual penetration.12

6. The Young Turks, This “Consent is Sexy” Video is Anything But Sexy, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUwAKhHDX1U.
7. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1401 (2005) (arguing that only verbal
permission should suffice).
8. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-2 (West 2016); UCMJ art. 920 (West 2016).
9. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 ; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2016).
10. E.g., Sexual Misconduct, Relationship Violence, and Stalking, N.Y.U. (Sep. 30, 2015),
https://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/SexualMisconductPolicy.9.30.15.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Sex Discrimination and Sexual Misconduct, PRINCETON UNIV.
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.princeton.edu/pub/rrr/part1/index.xml#comp13 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
11. Infra Part I.
12. Infra Part II.
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II. THE MEANING OF CONSENT
Some consent definitions appear to require active cooperation. 13 But it seems
doubtful that any such provision is applied literally. In practice, the aim is to
determine when the totality of an individual’s conduct, including action and
inaction, communicates willingness for the act of sexual intimacy to occur. 14 A
suitable definition of consent therefore need only make clear that a person
contemplating an act of sexual penetration is not entitled to assume the other
party’s willingness and that the person who initiates physical intimacy must take
steps to ascertain whether mutual desire is present.15 But this effort need not take
any particular form; artificial verbal or behavioral contortions are not required.16
The point is simply to stress that before sexual penetration occurs, the person
initiating that act must look for positive indications of willingness, exercising
common sense and taking into account all the relevant circumstances.
An overly flexible concept of consent, however, could easily become a
placeholder for divergent norms of sexual behavior or even an enabling
mechanism for the wishful thinking of sexual aggressors. At one time, sexually
assertive men were permitted to conclude that “no” did not really mean no, on
the pretext that other aspects of the complainant’s behavior—for example, her
skimpy clothing—indicated consent. 17 A viable criminal code should leave no
ambiguity about the legitimacy of such a claim; it must make clear that any
verbal expression of disinclination establishes a lack of consent, absent
subsequent words or actions clearly communicating willingness.18
To clarify the governing norms, a well-drafted code should likewise stipulate
that passive behavior cannot automatically establish willingness, since often the
opposite could be just as likely, e.g. where fright or heavy drinking impairs a
person’s ability to resist. Silence cannot be equated with consent to an action that
the person did not anticipate or had no adequate opportunity to protest. Thus,
mere lack of physical or verbal resistance does not by itself constitute consent.

13. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (defining consent as “positive cooperation in act or attitude”);
WIS. STAT. §940.225(4) (defining consent as “words or overt actions . . . indicating freely given agreement”);
State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 234 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (defining consent as ““voluntary agreement”); State in
the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (defining consent as “affirmative permission”).
14. MPC, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at § 213.2(1)(a), cmt. 1.
17. John F. Decker, et al., “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform
Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1082 (2011).
18. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(d) (defining lack of consent to require that “the victim
clearly expressed that he or she did not consent . . . and a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have
understood such person’s words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the
circumstances”), with Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that
“when a woman says ‘no,’ . . . any implication other than a manifestation of non-consent that might arise in a
person’s psyche is legally irrelevant, and thus no defense”).
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Nonetheless, the absence of any sign of unwillingness is a common way to
communicate receptivity in the context of gradual, increasingly intimate sexual
foreplay, at least absent circumstances that might suggest fear or impairment. As
a result, a contextually sensitive standard of consent-by-conduct must leave room
for considering silence and passivity, together with all other circumstances, in
assessing whether a person’s conduct communicates receptivity to anticipated
sexual initiatives. The point to stress is that while silence and passivity cannot by
themselves be treated as consent, they are forms of conduct, and all of a person’s
conduct should be taken into account. This approach avoids the artificiality of
positing that silent acquiescence can never constitute consent, without at the
opposite extreme treating mere inaction as consent even when the person
concerned did not expect sexual penetration or could not object before it
occurred.
With these considerations in mind, I propose the following as a workable and
socially realistic definition of consent:19
(a) “Consent” means a person’s behavior, including words and conduct—
both action and inaction—that communicates the person’s willingness to
engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact.
(b) Consent may be express, or it may be inferred from a person’s
behavior. Neither verbal nor physical resistance is required to establish the
absence of consent; the person’s behavior must be assessed in the context
of all the circumstances to determine whether the person has consented.
(c) Consent may be revoked any time before or during the act of sexual
penetration or sexual contact, by behavior communicating that the person
is no longer willing. A clear verbal refusal—such as “No,” “Stop,” or
“Don’t”—suffices to establish the lack of consent. A clear verbal refusal
also suffices to withdraw previously communicated willingness in the
absence of subsequent behavior that communicates willingness before the
sexual act occurs.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENT
When consent is understood in these contextual terms, there is a compelling
justification for requiring that it be given prior to sexual penetration. Part A of
this section addresses the basic normative case for a consent requirement. 20 Part

19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 15, 2016). The
Commentary to this and related provisions offers several illustrations as benchmarks for applying this
contextually sensitive standard. Id.
20. Infra Section A.
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B then canvasses the current state of legal and social norms concerning the
expression of consent/nonconsent, 21 and Part C addresses a variety of practical
concerns often raised in opposition to a consent requirement. 22
A. The Normative Case
If law lacks a consent requirement, it in effect presumes that all individuals
are receptive to sexual intercourse—at any time, with any person—until they
communicate their unwillingness. In contrast, the premise of a consent
requirement is that individuals do not want to be sexually penetrated unless and
until they indicate that they do. Across the wide range of situations in which
acquaintances and strangers encounter one another—on the street, at work, in
parks, at parties, on dates—a presumption of disinterest in sexual intimacy is
accurate much more often than a presumption that both individuals want to have
intercourse with each other. And as a matter of first principles, it is more
appropriate to assume that each individual prefers bodily privacy until he or she
indicates otherwise. Only substantial practical impediments could justify a
standard that presumes round-the-clock availability for intercourse and requires
individuals to clearly communicate their intention to revoke it.
No practical concerns of this sort can be shown. Indeed, practical concerns
strongly support a consent requirement. Sexual interaction too often occurs when
the ability of one or both parties to express unwillingness is impaired. A person
may experience fright or intimidation—for example, in settings involving
unfamiliar surroundings, surprise, or unexpectedly aggressive sexual advances.23
Most important, sexual encounters commonly occur—perhaps more often than
not—in the context of social drinking or extended partying, and frequently one or
both individuals are intoxicated to some degree. 24 That pervasive situation
readily lends itself to miscommunication, impaired capacity to express and/or
interpret social signals, and inability to physically or verbally resist unwanted
advances. 25
Under those circumstances, a standard that prohibits penetration only when
there is coercion, incapacity, or acts that clearly signal unwillingness presents
unacceptable dangers of sexual abuse. In contrast, a standard that prohibits
penetration until a person communicates consent to a sexual act with words or
conduct mitigates those dangers at no significant social cost. Parties who
mutually desire sexual intimacy normally communicate that desire freely; in the
event of ambiguity, one party need only clarify the other’s wishes. Resolving
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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Infra Section C.
MPC, supra note 1, at § 213.0(3).
Id. at pp. 62–64.
Id.
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ambiguity can be as simple as asking “all cool?”; it need not comply with any
talismanic formula.
One often-mentioned concern is the risk of unfairness to an accused who was
also intoxicated.26 But that concern can be addressed by a distinct requirement of
mens rea—requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant’s awareness of all the relevant facts.27 There is no need—and a large
cost—in seeking to avert that problem by the overbroad tactic of withholding
criminal sanctions even when the person who takes the initiative is well aware
that the other party has not given consent.
B. The Current State of Legal and Social Norms
These considerations favoring a consent requirement are gaining everincreasing recognition. The trend in criminal law, in codes of conduct in schools
and colleges, and in social norms more generally—is one of steadily growing
support for consent as a legal requirement.28 Although older generations recall
social norms and sexual scripts in which male initiative and female reticence
were taken for granted in mutually desired sexual interaction (an assumption at
odds with a consent requirement), substantial segments of American society now
consider the expectation of consent perfectly realistic. In a recent Kaiser Family
Foundation poll of over one thousand young adults, sixty-nine percent said that a
strong form of the consent requirement—“the Yes Means Yes Standard”—is
“realistic . . . when individuals are initiating and engaging in any sexual
activity.” 29 Only thirty percent said the standard is “[n]ot realistic.”30 Among
college students, polls find even stronger support for defining consent as
“conscious, positive willingness,” with no significant gender differences.31 The
generational divide on the issue is marked with support for a consent standard
much stronger among respondents under thirty than among those over sixty. 32

26. Id. at 62–68.
27. Id. at 63–64.
28. 50
States
of
Consent
Map
Legend,
AFFIRMATIVE
CONSENT,
http://affirmativeconsent.com/affirmative-consent-laws-state-by-state/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of College Students on Sexual Assaults, WASH.
POST, Jan. 15–Mar. 29, 2015, at 14, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/washington-post-kaiserfamily-foundation-survey-of-college-students-on-sexual-assault/1726/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
30. When the poll asked which standard—affirmative consent or “no means no” (a standard under which
“sexual activity must stop if one person objects”)—was “the better standard to use when determining whether
sexual activity is consensual or not,” forty-two percent preferred “no means no,” but fifty-seven percent
preferred affirmative consent or thought there was “not much difference”—with virtually identical preferences
among men and among women. Id.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Peter Moore, Yes Means Yes, YOUGOV, https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/10/06/sexual-assault/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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In formal standards of conduct, affirmative consent is increasingly required.
According to the Chronicle of Higher Education, more than 800 colleges and
universities—including all of the Ivies except Harvard—now require consent in
their codes of student conduct. 33 And both California and New York have
mandated an “affirmative consent” standard for all institutions of higher
education receiving state funds. 34
The criminal law picture, though more mixed, nonetheless indicates an
unmistakable trend in favor of requiring consent. Of the fifty-three most relevant
U.S. jurisdictions, including the D.C., U.S., and military codes, twenty-seven
now impose criminal sanctions for sexual penetration without consent.35 This
count does not include jurisdictions that directly or indirectly require force,
duress, verbal resistance, or some expression of unwillingness to convict; it
includes only jurisdictions in which absence of consent for penetration is
sufficient by itself to establish a criminal offense.
Thirteen jurisdictions punish the offense as a felony. 36 Fourteen additional
jurisdictions punish the offense as a misdemeanor. 37 The Uniform Code of
33. Jared Misner, California Shifts to ‘Yes Means Yes’ Standard for College Sex, CHRON. FOR HIGHER
EDUC. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/California-Shifts-to-Yes/149057/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
34. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2015).
“Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual
activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she
has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or
resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must be
ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating
relationship between the persons involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should
never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent.
Id.; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2015).
35. Many of these jurisdictions define consent in language suggesting “affirmative” consent— i.e., a
direct expression of willingness, permission or agreement. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 920(8) (“freely given
agreement”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (“positive cooperation in act or attitude . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-3-401(1.5); D.C. CODE § 22-3001(4) (“words or overt actions indicating a freely given agreement”);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70 (“freely given agreement”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341, subd. 4
(“words or overt actions by a person indicating a freely given present agreement”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
325 (“words or actions by a person indicating a voluntary agreement”); WASH. CODE REV. ANN. §
9A.44.010(7) (“actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4)
(“words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given agreement”); UNIF . C ODE OF M IL. J., Art. 120(g)(8);
State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (“voluntary agreement or concurrence”); State v. Blount,
770 P.2d 852 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (“capable, deliberate, and voluntary agreement”); State in the Interest of
MTS, 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (“affirmative and freely given permission”).
Many of the remaining jurisdictions that criminalize sexual penetration without consent define the term
more flexibly or do not define it at all. See, e.g., CONN. GENN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70 (West 2015); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.011 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020 (West
2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A (West 2015); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-305 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030
(West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2015);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.411 (West 2015); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 311 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503
(West 2015).
36. 10 U.S.C. § 920, Art. 120 (2015); FLA. STAT ANN. § 794.011 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
707-730 (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 255-A (2015); MISS.
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Military Justice defines consent largely in terms of positive agreement. 38 Abroad,
both Canada (in 1999) 39 and England (in 2003) expressly adopted the affirmative
consent approach. 40 The Canadian standard is not only satisfied when “the
accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying ‘no’, but is also
satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was
essentially not saying “yes.’” 41 In England “a person consents if he agrees by
choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.”42 Conviction can
be based on proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the other
person consented and “[w]hether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having
regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain
whether B consents.” 43 Although alarmism about the consent requirement

CODE ANN. § 97-3-95 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2
(West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.411 (West 2015); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 311 (West
2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251 (West 2015); WIS. STAT.
ANN § 940.225 (West 2015). Six of these expressly require affirmative permission, positive agreement or active
cooperation: Fla., Haw., N.J., Vt., Wis., and UCMJ. Two states allow an inference of consent from “implied
acquiescence”: Me. and Or. Five simply punish “penetration without consent,” without defining consent but
without requiring force, duress, verbal resistance or any expression of unwillingness: La., Miss., Okla., Pa., and
Tenn.
37. 10 U.S.C. § 920; CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401 (West
2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70 (West 2015); D.C. CODE § 22-3006 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1
(West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020 (West 2015); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-305 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341 (West 2015); MO. REV. STAT. §
566.030 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney
2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (2015). Among these fourteen, six jurisdictions define the required
consent in terms that involve affirmative permission, positive agreement or active cooperation: Cal., Colo.,
D.C., Kan., Minn., and Mont. Two others permit consent to be inferred under all the circumstances: Ky., and
N.Y. Six simply punish “penetration without consent,” without defining consent but without requiring force,
duress, verbal resistance or any expression of unwillingness: Conn., Ga., Md., Mo., S.D., and the U.S.C.
38. 10 U.S.C. § 920, Art.120(g)(8) (“The term ‘consent’ means a freely given agreement to the conduct
at issue by a competent person. . . . Lack of verbal or physical resistance . . . does not constitute consent. . . . All
the surrounding circumstances are to be considered in determining whether a person gave consent.”).
Subdivisions (b) and (f) also give operational significance to this definition by punishing as the equivalent of a
felony any nonconsensual sexual penetration. Id. at Art.120(b), (f).
39. R. v. Ewanchuk [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, 334 (Can.). In Canadian law consent is conceived as an
entirely subjective state of mind on the part of the complainant; consent means that “the complainant in her
mind wanted the sexual touching to take place.” Id. But the mens rea requires that the accused be “reckless of,
or willfully blind to, a lack of consent on the part of the person touched;” thus the “mens rea of sexual assault is
not only satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying ‘no,’ but
is also satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was essentially not saying ‘yes.’”
Id. (emphasis added).
40. Sexual Offenses Act, (2003) pt. 1, § 1 [hereinafter Sexual Offenses Act] (“A person (A) commits an
offence [of Rape] if — (a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his
penis, (b) B does not consent to the penetration, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.”). The
offense is punishable by life imprisonment. Id.
41. Ewanchuk, 1 S.C.R. at 334.
42. Sexual Offenses Act, supra note 40 at pt. 1, §74.
43. Id. at pt. 1, § 1(2). The Crown Prosecution Service’s policy guidance for prosecutors explains, “The
defendant (A) has the responsibility to ensure that (B) consents to the sexual activity at the time in question. It
will be important for the police to ask the offender in interview what steps (s)he took to satisfy him or herself
that the complainant consented in order to show his or her state of mind at the time.” CROWN PROSECUTION
SERVICE, PROSECUTION POLICY AND GUIDANCE, R APE AND SEXUAL OFFENCES, Chapter 3: Consent,
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pervades recent media accounts, which often portray the concept as a radically
new and dangerous innovation, the requirement is neither unusual nor new to the
criminal law. Pennsylvania’s criminal code affords a straightforward example:
[A] person commits a felony of the second degree when that person
engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a
complainant without the complainant’s consent.44
C. Practical Concerns
1. The Reality of Sexual Interaction
Underlying the nightmare scenarios of notarized consent agreements and
consent apps on every iPhone is the concern that unambiguous documentation,
even if not technically necessary, will become a de facto requirement because of
the factual ambiguity and uncertainty of attempting to establish consent on any
other basis, especially if consent is understood as nothing less than “positive
cooperation” or “affirmative agreement.” 45 But the flexible, contextual
conception of consent largely obviates this concern. In any event, the same
worry applies, with identical force, to almost any alternative approach, such as
one that equates non-consent with clearly communicated refusal. Unwillingness,
just like positive agreement, must be determined by assessing words and conduct
under the circumstances: Did the complainant turn away, cry, or attempt to push
the other person back? And were such actions emphatic, perfunctory, or merely
coy and seductive? The elusive, fact-sensitive inquiry into the meaning of
conduct can be avoided only by insisting that nothing except the word “no” can

available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_ offences/consent (emphasis added) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
44. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 2015). Pennsylvania pattern jury instructions for this
offense read as follows:
To find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that the following three elements
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant had [sexual intercourse]
[deviate sexual intercourse] with [name of victim]; Second, that the defendant had the intercourse
without [name of victim]’s consent; and Third, that the defendant acted knowingly or at least
recklessly regarding [name of victim]’s nonconsent. . . . Consent is present if the victim at the time
of the alleged crime [is willing that [give specifics]] [is willing that [give specifics] and makes [his]
[her] willingness known to the defendant by words or behavior] [give specifics].
Id. (emphasis added).
45. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 920(8) (“freely given agreement”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (“positive
cooperation in act or attitude . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (“actual words or conduct
indicating freely given agreement”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (“words or overt actions . . . indicating a
freely given agreement”); UNIF. C ODE OF M IL. J., Art. 120(g)(8); State in the Interest of MTS, 609 A.2d 1266
(N.J. 1992) (“affirmative and freely given permission”).
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establish non-consent, a solution just as absurd as insisting that nothing except
the word “yes” can establish the presence of consent.
Fact-finding difficulty is undeniable in any regime that takes conduct and
circumstances into account. But there is no acceptable alternative. And a consent
standard is no worse in these terms than any other approach that respects the
complexity of sexual communication.
2. Gap-Fillers
An important reason for requiring consent is that competent adults often find
intercourse abhorrent but are not able to say so—e.g., individuals taken by
surprise; persons immobilized by unexpectedly aggressive sexual advances;
heavily intoxicated individuals. In response, opponents of reform sometimes
suggest that the law could manage without a general consent requirement by
relying instead on specific gap-fillers to cover these problematic situations. Many
existing statutes illustrate this possibility by permitting a complainant’s passivity
to suffice for conviction under special circumstances.
But statutes now on the books do not solve the problem because they
typically define those special circumstances very narrowly, requiring proof that
the complainant was unable to express unwillingness. 46 An adequate gap filler
would have to lower that hurdle. But a more flexible concept of “incapacity”
would inevitably entail considerable vagueness. Moreover, fairness to the
defendant, a prominent concern for those who resist a general consent
requirement, requires that the defendant be aware of the other party’s incapacity.
Indeed, many states that impose liability for negligent failure to realize the
absence of consent nonetheless require subjective awareness of the absence of
capacity to consent, precisely because that condition is so elusive and outside the
ken of the ordinary citizen.47 Yet people observing an impaired person often have
difficulty assessing the degree of impairment. Jurors are not easily persuaded,
and should not easily be persuaded, that a defendant realized the complainant’s
incapacity. As a result, the need to prove the defendant’s awareness of the
incapacity could rarely be met across the range of situations of concern (i.e.
surprise, tonic immobility, heavy drinking), even when the defendant was not
drinking himself.
The upshot is that a large class of cases falls into a grey area where a
person’s willingness to accept sexual intimacy is unclear, but his or her ability to
protest is also unclear. An act of sexual penetration is clearly and inexcusably

46. Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
131, 139 (2002).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2016).
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abusive in these circumstances, but absent a consent requirement, such an act
would be legally permissible.
3. Workability
Those who object to requiring consent often assert that a criminal law
requirement of this sort is not workable, or that such a requirement, where
adopted, simply is not enforced. 48 On-the-ground research in jurisdictions that
have a strong “affirmative-consent” requirement finds a degree of truth to these
impressions, but also considerable exaggeration. Prosecutors acknowledge the
obvious—that they are more hesitant to charge and that juries are more reluctant
to convict in the absence of physical injury, threats of force, or clear verbal
protests. 49 But resistance to consent requirements, even where “affirmativeconsent” provisions are now on the books, is much less evident in some
jurisdictions than in others. And in contrast to earlier research, 50 more recent
surveys find no state in which an enacted consent standard is consistently ignored
or considered unenforceable. 51
4. The Burden of Proof
The consent requirement preserves the prosecutor’s burden to establish that
the complainant’s words and conduct did not indicate willingness and that the
defendant knew as much. A jury that entertains a reasonable doubt on either issue
must acquit. 52 A change in the elements of an offense obviously can shrink the
factual area in which doubts will require acquittal. For example, a reform
eliminating the offense element of physical force relieves the prosecution of the
burden of proving a previously required fact. But such a reform raises no due
process difficulty and changes in no way the prosecutor’s procedural burden to
prove all elements of the offense as newly defined. A law that makes the
normative judgment to remove demonstrated unwillingness as an element of the

48. Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2015, at SR1 (quoting a critic of the consent
requirement as saying “It’s an unworkable standard.”).
49. CASSIA C. SPOHN ET AL., PROSECUTORS’ CHARGING DECISIONS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: A
MULTI-SITE
STUDY,
FINAL
REPORT
59
(2002),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197048.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
50. E.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE
OF THE LAW 25 (1998).
51. Data from Wisconsin, for example, show hundreds of non-compromise convictions on this basis in
Milwaukee County alone. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 8,
2015), at 67 & note 187.
52. See, e.g., supra note 44 (quoting Pennsylvania pattern jury instructions which state that to convict,
the jury “must find . . . beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the defendant had the intercourse without [name of
victim]’s consent; and . . . that the defendant acted knowingly or at least recklessly regarding [name of victim]’s
nonconsent.”).
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offense and instead to require permission before an act of sexual penetration
stands on a similar footing.
To be sure, a law requiring consent prior to penetration does impose a
behavioral burden on previously permissible conduct. Absent a consent
requirement, an individual who wants sex is permitted to assume willingness and
need make no effort to determine the other party’s actual wishes; a person who
takes the initiative has no burden of inquiry, and the other party bears the burden
to communicate her unwillingness. A consent requirement instead obliges the
person who initiates a sexual advance to ascertain whether the other party is
willing. One can debate whether this change in prohibited behavior is
normatively desirable. It is incorrect, however, to equate this shift in prohibited
behavior with a shift in the prosecutor’s burden at trial to establish the behavior
that had occurred.
5. Over-Incarceration
The many states that already punish penetration in the absence of consent
provide no evidence that adoption of this standard will trigger a flood of new
prisoners. Across the spectrum of sexual offenses, from the more aggravated
offenses to those based only on absence of consent, crimes remain heavily
underreported and undercharged. 53 Investigation and prosecution are resourceintensive; victims remain reluctant to subject themselves to arduous legal
processes; crucial facts are highly context- and credibility-dependent; and the
essential offense elements are comparatively difficult to prove. As a result of
these barriers to conviction, the apparently high incidence of rape and sexual
assault has not translated into correspondingly frequent convictions and prison
sentences. Although the option to charge on the basis of non-consent alone is
increasingly invoked where available, it is subject to the same difficulties that
impede prosecution for more aggravated sexual offenses. And these obstacles—
mostly inherent in the contextually complex facts—will keep the volume of cases
comparatively small even in the pessimistic scenario in which citizen behavior
makes no adjustment to new legal standards.
To be sure, the severity and relative inflexibility of criminal sanctions make
potential over-reliance on criminal law an important issue, regardless of case
volume and even if incarceration rates overall were low. This Article addresses
that issue below. But the contemporary problem of mass incarceration is largely a
consequence of drug enforcement policy, harsh mandatory minimums, zerotolerance probation revocation, over-use of prison to punish nonviolent property

53. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 585 (2009)
(discussing that date rape crimes continue to go underreported).
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crime, and similar problems. 54 Any solution to America’s bloated prison
population must be framed in those terms; sexual offense policy is neither a
cause of the problem nor a means to alleviate it in any significant way.
6. Plea Bargaining
Many observers worry that when allegations are very serious (a violent
assault or blatant disregard of emphatic resistance), but credibility is sharply
contested, a prosecutor might fall back on the lesser charge of non-consent, and a
defendant facing serious felony counts might well find that plea offer
irresistible.55 The upshot would be conviction on a lesser charge when in
principle the defendant should have been acquitted of all charges because of
reasonable doubt about whether any criminal conduct had occurred at all.
Such an outcome deserves criticism. But unfortunately, there is little reason
to believe that this troublesome dynamic is less prevalent in jurisdictions that do
not have an offense based on the absence of consent. The criminal code of every
jurisdiction affords prosecutors a wide range of fallback offenses (including
sexual offenses) to wield strategically if they seek to insure a guilty plea in a
factually disputed case—charges such as attempted rape, attempted sexual
assault, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, unlawful sexual contact,
and so on. 56 Whatever the prosecution’s strategic calculus and policy preferences,
its ability to secure a lesser-offense plea is not significantly affected by adding
one more fallback offense to its already long list of bargaining options.
Practicing attorneys confirm this expectation. Defense counsel in affirmativeconsent jurisdictions describe a range of offenses, both sex- and non-sex based,
that serve as the default plea in a variety of cases; 57 the absence-of-consent
offense is not distinctive in this way. Nor is there any indication that the pleabargaining dynamic differs in jurisdictions that reject a consent requirement; on
the evidence of current experience, the absence of a consent requirement does not
impede prosecutors’ plea bargaining tactics, because alternative fallback
options—with a wide range of penalties—supply ample sources of leverage.
7. Re-shaping Social Norms
Many critics of the consent standard insist that criminal law should accept
social norms as they stand. 58 They argue that—at least outside the area of lowlevel regulatory offenses—the criminal law should not punish behavior absent a
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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clear social consensus that the conduct involves moral turpitude.59 They insist,
moreover, that an attempt to use criminal law to reshape social norms is bound to
prove unfair and ineffective. 60 Alcohol prohibition, they say, is the classic case in
point. 61
The first difficulty here is that the social norm has already gravitated toward
a consent requirement, not only in public opinion and college codes of behavior
but also in the criminal law itself.62 But equally important, criminal sanctions are
sometimes necessary to prevent harmful behavior, even when a significant
segment of society fails to appreciate its dangers. This is especially true when, as
in the case of unwanted sexual intrusion, the dangers bear most heavily on a
discrete group, in this case, women, who have traditionally had less influence in
shaping the relevant social norms.
Moreover, using criminal law to discredit harmful social norms can be fair
and effective. The failure of alcohol prohibition does not suggest otherwise
because that experiment sought to criminalize transactions between fully
consenting adults. Efforts to deter victimless crime are notoriously problematic
and hold few lessons for situations in which one party sees himself or herself as
the victim of traumatic abuse. Classic instances of the latter include domestic
violence and drunk driving. In both instances, practices that until recently were
viewed as normal and even legitimate, such as police unwillingness to intrude
into “private” domestic disputes or offering a driver “one for the road,” now are
widely condemned, in part because of changes in criminal justice policy.
Even more pertinent in the present context is the rape reform initiative
eliminating physical force as a required element of felonious sexual assault. Only
a few decades ago, a deeply ingrained cultural belief system held that male
disregard of verbally expressed unwillingness was not aberrant or even
inappropriate. That viewpoint was eroding only slowly until legal reform,
moving ahead of the social norm, made clear that “no means no” was a legal
principle, not just the slogan of a fringe movement.
8. Overly Punitive Responses
Far too often, our society applies criminal sanctions too harshly and
inflexibly, and such approaches are especially common in the case of sexual
offenses. But that fact cannot be permitted to drive the substantive offense
definitions of a well-designed penal code. If overly punitive sanctions are taken

59. Id. at 406.
60. Id.
61. Mark Thorton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 157 (1991),
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
62. Supra Part III.B.
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as a given, they understandably push criminal justice reformers to set high
substantive barriers to conviction; the egregious cases that pass that threshold in
turn reinforce support for those harsh sanctions and may even generate sentiment
for making those sanctions even more severe. Convicted defendants obviously
lose from this dynamic, but victim interests are damaged too because severity
reinforces the perceived need to limit conviction to the most egregious conduct
and to leave less serious abuses unpunished. And even then, accusations that fall
into a grey area can have disastrous consequences for the accused, because the
defendant convicted of a grey-area offense bears the full brunt of the system’s
harsh penalties.
This is no way to frame a model approach to criminal justice policy. A
constructive statutory structure must insist on scaling back penalty levels and
delineating distinct levels of offense seriousness. In this way, reform proposals
can offer a coherent overall approach. Rather than distorting optimal
recommendations on the basis of anticipated political reaction, recommendations
for reform have far greater clarity and force when they confront public sentiment
head-on and cogently criticize unwarranted practices.
9. Discriminatory Enforcement
Far more troubling is the concern that a consent requirement would be
unevenly enforced, with greatest impact on defendants of color and LGBT
communities, while under-protecting minority victims. 63 America’s history of
abusive rape prosecutions against Black men suspected of intimacy with white
women makes worries about discriminatory enforcement readily
understandable. 64 Charging and adjudication, even in the case of lower-level
offenses, could well be influenced by racial stereotypes and lack of empathy for
individuals who are seen as cultural or socioeconomic outsiders. A particular
prosecutor might, for example, more readily pursue alleged violations of a
consent requirement when the complainant is an upper-middle-class white
woman accusing a working-class Black man. Conversely, some prosecutors may
be less willing to enforce a consent requirement when the person claiming to
have suffered abuse is a gay man or an African-American woman. In these ways
a consent requirement could result in both over-enforcement against low-status
defendants and under-enforcement in cases involving a low-status victim.

63. Gruber, supra note 53, at 606 (discussing under-enforcement of criminal laws involving minority
victims); Lise Gotell, Governing Heterosexuality through Specific Consent: Interrogating the Governmental
Effects of R. v J.A., 24 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 359, 367 (2012) (discussing difficulties of affirmative consent as to
sexual minorities, including Aboriginal women, homeless women, and women with disabilities).
64. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1977); see e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 81–82 (1967) (vacating the sentences of AfricanAmerican appellants who had been sentenced to death, and remanding because of due process violations).
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The danger of unequal enforcement, however, cannot be allowed to exert an
all-purpose veto over efforts to fill gaps in the criminal law. Bias in the
administration of justice is a deep systemic problem that calls for systemic
remedies, not constraints on otherwise justified definitions of crimes. Law
enforcement responses to domestic violence make this principle clear. There is
convincing evidence that the criminal justice system too often takes domestic
violence complaints less seriously when they are brought forward on behalf of a
poor Black woman or a victim in the LGBT community. 65 That sort of bias must
be addressed, but it is not plausible to do so by returning to the days when
domestic violence enforcement was neglected across the board. A solution to
discrimination cannot be achieved by equal non-protection of citizens at risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
It’s time to recognize that physically penetrating another person’s body
without their permission is serious misconduct that our society and our criminal
law ought to condemn. The need for permission is elementary, and it need not be
understood in terms of written contracts, artificial verbal formulas, or any other
unrealistic behavioral ritual. Ordinary citizens know what it means to have
permission, express or implied, and they know that it is unacceptable to take
liberties with someone’s person or property without permission. That’s all that
consent means, and it’s a matter of simple justice to require it.

65. Max D. Siegel, Surviving Castle Rock: The Human Rights of Domestic Violence, 18 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 727, 740 (2011–2012) (discussing deficiencies in the criminal justice system as to minorities and
domestic violence); Caitlin Valiulis, Domestic Violence, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 123, 151 (2013–2014)
(discussing deficiencies in the criminal justice system as to the LGBT community and domestic violence).
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